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Introduction *
The title of this conference is “Violence and Peace in Our Times.” The reason 
we chose this is because 9.11 was a shock that woke us all from the sense of 
boundless optimism with which we greeted the Third Millennium.
Ever since the dawn of history, man has lived with violence. Even in our so-
called ‘civilized’ age, we have lived with violence, both major and minor. With the 
fall of Communism, the violence of the “Liberation Front” has been weakened only to
be succeeded by “racial cleansing” of Kosovo, the genocide of East Timor and then 
finally 9.11. Of course, by violence here, we mean intentional violence perpetrated 
through overt, physical acts. ‘Even while waging a war every man wants peace 
whereas no one wants war while he is making peace,’ said St. Augustine. (omnis enim
homo etiam belligerando pacem quaerit: nemo autem bellum pacificando. (De 
Civitate Dei, 19, 12)1 However, true peace comes from a peaceful order and the right 
human order can only be based on justice. In this paper, I will be comparing St. 
Thomas’ theories on violence, justice and peace with those of Confucianism.
1
* For this article, the Latin text of St. Thomas' Summa Theologiae (Marietti, Roma, 1952) and the 
English Translation of the Summa with Latin text by the members of a.p. (Blackfriars, New York, 
1960-), to confer the English composition, are used.
 Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, 19, 12. Translated by Gerald G. Walsh, S.J., Grace Monahan, a.s.u., 
Daniel J. Honan. Image Books, New York, 1958.
I. Violence
St. Thomas explored the essence of violence through an investigation of will. 
An act of will is an inclination which arises from an inner and conscious principle. 
However, violence and coercion comes from the outside. As such, violence and 
coercion stands fundamentally against the specific nature of will. It works against 
natural inclinations. It is like a stone is thrown upwards against its natural tendency. 
Man can be led through coercion, however, it is not rooted in his will. So violence is 
against human nature. If an action is based upon his will, it is against the essence of 
coercion.2
Moreover, even if the will inevitably seeks the ultimate end, it is not as if will 
is forced to want it. Coercion (coactio) indicates the application of force. As Aristotle 
expounds in the 3rd book of Ethics violence is of external origin. One does not suffer 
violence through internal inclination. This is clear from the example of the stone 
given above. Therefore, if will desires something through natural inclination, even 
though it does so out of necessity, it is not because of coercion but nature.3
2 S. Theol. la 2ae, 6, 4, c.
'actus voluntatis nihil est aliud quam inclinatio quaedam procedens ab interiori principio cognoscente, 
sicut appetitus naturalis est quaedam inclinatio ab interiori principio et sine cognitione. Quod autem est
coactum vel violentum est ab exteriori principio. Unde contra ratione m ipsius actus voluntatis est quod
sit coactus vel violentus; sicut etiam est contra rationem naturalis inclinationis vel motus lapidis quod 
feratur sursum; potest enim lapis per violentiam ferri sursum, sed quod iste motus violentus sit ex eius 
naturali inclinatione esse non potest. Similiter etiam potest homo per violentiam trahi, sed quod hoc sit 
ex eius voluntate repugnat rationi violentiae.' Cf. S. Th. la, 82, 1, c.
3 Quaestio disputata de Veritate, 22. 5, c.
'quamvis autem quadam necessaria inclinatione ultimum finem velit voluntas; nullo tamen modo 
conceden dum est quod ad illud volendum cogatur. Coactio enim nihil aliud est quam violentiae 
cuiusdam inductio. Violentum autem est, secundum philosophum in ill Ethic.(l, 1110 a 13, b 1-4,16-
17), cuius principium est extra, nihil conferente vim passo; sicut si lapis sursum proiiciatur; quia nullo 
modo, quantum est de se, ad hunc motum inclinatur, sed cum ipsa voluntas sit quaedam inclinatio eo 
quod est appetitus quidam, non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid velit, et inclinatio eius non sit in 
illud; et ita non potest contingere ut voluntas aliquid coacte vel violente velit, etiam etsi aliquid naturali
inclinatione velit. Patet igitur quod vulntas non necessario aliquid vult necessitate coactionis, velut 
II. Human Nature (natura)
I now wish to speak of nature that is subjected to external force, that is, 
violence. St. Thomas regards the essence of being as nature. St. Thomas refers to “I. 
De duabus naturis" by Boetius and Aristotle’s statement in V. Metaphysics that 
substance (substantia) is nature (natura). St. Thomas says, “The Philosopher, too, says
that every substance is a nature. (Aristotles, Metaph. V. 4. 1014 b 35) The term 
nature in this sense means the essence of a thing as directed to its specific operation, 
for no reality lacks its specific operation.”4 As such “homo est (aliquid) compositum 
ex anima et corpore”, that is, "man is a compound of soul and body.”5 St. Thomas 
regarded human beings as having both material (materialitas) and non-material nature
(immaterialitas), or spiritual nature (spiritualitas). This is because man engages in not 
only material but non-material activity. In his cognitive activity, man also recognizes 
himself. Material operation operates on other beings but not on itself. This is clearly 
seen in the act of self-reflection of man. Such non-material spiritual operation is the 
operation of an intellectual soul.6 
tamen aliquid necessario necessitate naturalis inclinationis.'
4 The original Latin text. De ente et essentia, Marietti, 1957, transl. By Tjeng, Eui-Chai with the Latin 
Text, 1995, Seokwang Publishing Co. Seoul p. 20.
'Boetius, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi, (cap. 1) assignat; quod natura dicitur esse illud 
quocumque modo intellectu capi potest et sic etiam dicit Philosophus in 5 Metaphysicae, quod omnis 
substantia est natura. Nomen autem naturae hoc modo sumptae videtur significareessentiam rei 
secundum quod habet ordinem vel ordinationem ad propriam operationem rei, quum nulla res proria 
destituatur operatione.'
On being and essence, Trans. Armand Maurer, The Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1983, 
Toronto. pp. 31-32. Natura: Ibid. footnote 12: 'Etymologically, the Latin word natura, like the Greek 
equivalent physis; and the English 'nature', means the 'birth'.'
Andre Leonard, Il fondamento della morale, 1990, San Paolo, Trino, Milano, p. 217. 'Il termine natura 
viene dal substantivo latino natura che si costruisce a partire dal participio passato natus del verbo 
nasci, che significa nascere. Etimologicamente il termine natura designa la situazione nativa di un 
essere, 10 stato che eredita in virtu della sua nascita.'
5 S. Th. la. 75, 4, c.
'homo est (aliquid) compositum ex anima et corpore.'
6 S. Th. la. 87, 3, c.
   'Dicendum quod, sicut jam dictum est, unumquodque cognoscitur secundum quod est actu. Ultima 
autem perfectio intellectus est ejus operatio: non enim est sicut actio tendens in alterum, quae sit 
perfectio operati, sicut aedificatio aedificati; sed manet in operante ut perfectio et actus ejus, ut dicitur 
IX Metaphys. (c. 8, 1050 a 23 b 2) Hoc igitur est primum quod de intellectu intelligitur, scilicet ipsum 
III. Human Person
Human dignity is rooted in personality. From a Christian perspective, a human
person (or personality) attains its dignity precisely because it is a divine image (imago
Dei), that is to say, image of the divine essence and divine person (persona divina). 
“Among all other substances, individual beings with rational nature have a special 
name, and this is ‘person’. That is why in this definition of person, the terms 
‘individual’ is used to mean a singular being in the category of substance; ‘rational 
nature’ is added to mean the singular being among rational substances’.”7 This 
conceptualization of person by St. Thomas was influenced by Boetius’s De Duabus 
Naturis that “Persona est naturae rationalis substantia”.8 Thus, St. Thomas defines 
person as “Omne indiviuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona.”9 Seen in this light, the 
concept of person contains “substantia individualis”, “inseitas/perseitas”, “integritas”, 
“incommunicabilitas” and “inviolability”.10 It is in this way that the essence of 
humanity or human nature is explained in terms of person. Person, thus conceived, 
attains even spirituality, because a human soul is characterized by “immaterialitas” 
that excludes “materialitas”.
ejus intelligere.
   Sed circa hoc diversi intellectus diversimode se habent.
   Est enim aliquis intellectus, scilicet divinus, qui est ipsum suum intelligere. Et sic in Deo idem est 
quod intelligat se intelligere, et quod intelligat suam essentiam: quia sua essentia est suum intelligere.
   Est autem alius intel1ectus, scilicet angelicus, qui non est suum intelligere, sed tamen primum 
objectum sui intelligere est ejus essentia. Unde etsi aliud sit in angelo, secundum ratione m, quod 
intelligat se inteligere, et quod intelligat suam esentiam, tamen simul et uno actu utrumque intelligit: 
quia hoc quod est intelligere suam essentiam, est propria perfectio suae essentiae; simul autem et uno 
actu intelligitur res cum sua perfectione.
   Est autem alius intellectus, scilicet humanus, qui nec est suum intelligere, nec sui intelligere est 
objectum primum ipsa ejus essentia, sed aliquid extrinsecum, scilicet natura materialis rei.
   Et ideo id quod prima cognoscitur ab intellectu humano est hujusmodi objectum; et secundario 
cognoscitur ipse actus quo cognoscitur objectum; et per acturn cognoscitur ipse intellectus, cujus est 
perfectio ipsum inteiligere. Et ideo Philosophus (De Anima II, 4, 415a 16-22.) dicit quod objecta 
praecognoscuntur actibus, et actus potentiis. Cf. In I Sent. d. 17. 1, 5 ad 3. Expositio super liberum de 
causis 1. 7. Paolo Siweck, Psychologia Metaphysica, 1956, Universitas Gregoriana, Roma pp. 465-477.
7 S. Th. la. 29, 1, c.
   ' … inter ceteras substantias quoddam speciale nomen habent singularia rationalis naturae, et hoc 
nomen est 'persona'. Et ideo in praedicta definitione personae ponitur 'substantia individua', inquantum 
significat singulare in genere substantiae; additur autem 'rationalis naturae', inquantum significat 
singulare in rationalibus substantiis.'
8 Boetius, De duabus naturis et una persona Christi, c 3 in Migne, PL 46 col. 1345.
9 S. Th. la. 29, 3, c et ad 2
10 Tjeng, Eui-Chai. Metaphysics. Yeolin, 2001 edit. 11th, pp. 305-306.
IV. Imago Dei
A) A Possessor of Reason and Will
St. Thomas explains the meaning behind the idea that we are made in the 
image of God. According to him, “Man is made to God’s image, and since this 
implies, so Damascene tells us, that he is intelligent and free to judge and master of 
himself, so then, now that we have agreed that God is the exemplar cause of things 
and that they issue from his power through his will, we go on to look at this image, 
that is to say, at man as the source of actions which are his own and fall under his 
responsibility and control.”11 In the Trinity, the Son issues as the Logos of mind and 
the Holy Spirit as the Love of will, likewise in rational creatures there are an idea 
(verbum conceptum) and love (amor procendens). It means that ‘Man is made after 
God’s image.’12 God exists in things in two ways. Firstly as an operative cause (causa 
agens) and this way he exists in everything he creates. Secondly God exists in a 
special fashion in the reasoning creatures that are actually knowing and loving him, or
are disposed to do so.13
Nonetheless, that the image of God is immanent within a personality does not 
mean that it exists perfectly - it exists only imperfectly. This is what the Holy Script 
means when it says that man was made after the image of God. Thus, the preposition 
11 S. Th. la 2ae, Prologus: 'Sicut Damascenus dicit, homo factus ad imaglnem Dei dicitur, secundum 
quod per imagine m significatur intel1ectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativium, postquam 
praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de Deo, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum 
ejus voluntatem, restat ut consideremus de ejus imagine, idest de homine secundum quod et ipse est 
SUOrumoperum principium, quasi liberum arbiruim habens et suorum operum potestatem.'
12 S. Th. la. 45, 7, c.
'Processiones autem divinarum Personarum attenduntur secundum actus intel1ectus et voluntatis; nam 
Filius procedit ut Verbum intel1ectus, Spiritus Sanctus ut Amor voluntatis. In creaturis igitur 
rationalibus in quibus est intel1ectus et voluntas, invenitur repraesentatio Trinitatis per modum 
imaginis, inquantum invenitur in eis verbum conceptum et amor procedens.' Et S. Th 2ae, Prologus.
13 CL S. Th. la. 8, 3.
'Deus dicitur esse in re aliqua dupliciter. Uno modo per modum causea agentis, et sic est in omnibus 
rebus creatis ab ipso. Alio modo sicut objectum operationis est in operante, quod proprium est in 
operationibus animae secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc 
igitur secundo modo Deus specialiter est in rationali creatura quae cognoscit et diligit ipsum actu vel 
habitu.'
here, that is, “ad” in Latin, implies an "approach" that is adequate a description only 
when a distance [between God and humanity] is presupposed.14
B) The Image of the Holy Trinity
When St. Thomas regards man as containing the image of God, he means that 
humanity reflects the image of the Holy Trinity, that is, God’s one nature in three 
persons.15
Furthermore, he makes a distinction between: the resemblance to God 
(similitudo Dei), the image of God (imago Dei) and His trace (vestigium). “While all 
creatures bear some resemblance to God, only in a rational creature do you find a 
resemblance to God in the manner of an image; other things resemble him in the 
manner of a trace.”16
Following Damascenus, he also makes the clear distinction between the image
and likeness. The likeness to God in terms of image means that “his being in God’s 
image signifies his capacity for understanding, and for making free decisions in 
master of self”, while that in terms of likeness means that "he is in his likeness refers 
to the likeness of divine virtue, in so far as it can be in man.”17
Here, we are reminded of the openness and transcendency of personality 
insofar as it takes after the image of God. Man exists in a material world, in which he 
encounters other persons as well as material objects. Man actualizes himself by virtue 
of sharing trust and love and through communication with other intellectual (spiritual)
beings - that is, man can reach full self-development only in full communication with 
14 S. Th. la. 93, 1, c.
'Et ideo in homine dicitur esse imago Dei, non tamen perfecta sed imperfecta. Et hoc significat 
Scriptura, cum dicit hominem factum ad imaginem Dei; praepositio enim 'ad' accessum quendam 
significat, qui co.mpetit rei distanti.'
15 S. Th. la. 93, 5, c.
'Sic igitur dicendum est in homine esse imaginem Dei et quantum ad naturam divinam et quantum ad 
Trinitatem personarum; nam et in ipso Deo in tribus personis una existit natura.'
16 S. Th. la. 93, 6, c.
'cum in omnibus creaturis sit aliqualis Dei similitudo, in sola creatura rationali invenitur similitudo Dei 
per modum imaginis; in aliis autem creaturis per modum vestigii.'
17 S. Th. la. 93, 9, c.
'et secundum hoc Damascenus dicit (De Fide Ortl-L Il, c. 12) quod id quod est secundum imaginem, 
intellectuale significat et arbitrio liberum per se potestativium; quod autem secundum similitudinem, 
virtutis, secundum quod homini possibile est inesse, similitudinem.' (De Fide Orthodoxa Il, 12.)
other men. A human community (family, fraternal society, religious community, the 
state, international community) is formed through man's reaffirmation of his own 
interiority and communication with other personalities based on a respect for their 
dignity. This type of community is predicated on love. Since the possibilities of 
personality are boundless (open to the infinite), this kind of human communication 
ushers in an ultimate transcendence that leads to God. In fact, this personality 
conceived of in terms of God’s image is identical with the image of the Holy Trinity 
that consists in a communication of being, life and love that circulate from eternity to 
eternity within the divine nature and divine Persons.
Herein lies the dignity, inviolability, holiness and uniqueness of the human 
nature and human person that are the image of the divine nature and divine persons. 
From this follows our renewed recognition that our human nature and human person, 
which constitutes the supreme value of the humanity, are threatened by unjust 
violence.
V. Justice (Iustitia)
Achieving justice is a necessary precondition for ending violence and 
establishing peace. The 9.11 catastrophe reveals a profound gulf between the Islamic 
and American (including Israeli) concepts of justice. Even within the Western world, 
there are conflicting understandings of justice. The 9.11 incident, which was caused 
by Islamic extremists using American technology and all the American facilities, also 
struck hard the materialism and libertinism of the Western civilization, as was 
symbolically captured by the destruction of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon, 
which after all embody American technology, freedom, wealth and power. A few 
thousand souls were lost, and the world was horrified. As a response, US declared a 
war of an endless justice on terrorism and launched an offensive on the terrorist 
organization of Osama Bin-Laden's Al Quaeda in Afghanistan. Muslims replied in 
kind, in the name of a holy war. Invoking the first-borns' rights of Ismael and Isaac, 
two of Abraham's sons, Muslims protest the Israeli policy of occupation in Palestine, 
perpetuating the bloody conflicts. The latent resentment against the historical role that
Western colonialism played in the region, needless to say, cannot be ignored.
Under such circumstances, humanity is hard pressed to reexamine the question
of justice in the new light, thereby cultivating an inter-civilizational dialogue. The 
Catholic Church has been instrumental in promoting peace in our violent times. Most 
notably, it made a large spiritual contribution to the demise of Communist regimes 
that threatened world peace in the name of emancipation.
Achieving justice was always at the heart of a Catholic approach to peace, and
the Catholic concept of justice was always predicated on its understanding of 
universal value of personality that can suggest a concrete solution to the problem. . 
The Catholic understanding of personality and justice is dominated by St. Thomas's 
interpretation of the Holy Scriptures. In what follows, I will explore the traditional 
Catholic theory of justice in the light of recent circumstances, while comparing it to 
its Confucian counterpart for the Asian-Pacific age.
A) St. Thomas's Theory of Justice
Justice is the indirect cause of peace, and not its immediate cause. That is to 
say, peace is an indirect consequence of justice. For justice removes the obstacles to 
peace. The immediate cause of peace is love.18 Justice is beneficial to people in 
violence and peace.19 Justice ushers war into peace. In order to realize peace, justice is
an indispensable precondition, whether in the Orient or Occident. Therefore, I will 
present St. Thomas's and Confucian 'theories of justice in the light of today's topic, 
‘Violence and Peace in Our Times’.
1) Definition of Justice
St. Thomas defines justice as “the lasting and constant will of rendering to 
each one his right.”20
This definition is predicated on his understanding of human nature. As a being
endowed with life in this world, man is given the rights that nature demands in order 
to lead a human life. As this nature is innately communitarian, it demands that we 
18 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 3.
'Pax est opus justitiae indirecte, inquantum scilicet removet prohibens. Sed est opus caritatis directe, 
quia secundum propriam rationem caritas pacem causat.'
19 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 12, c.
20 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 1, c.
'iustitia est habitus secundum quem aliquis constanti et perpetua voluntate ius suum unicuique tribuit'
realize ourselves in the community we are embedded in. This demand is tantamount 
to that of justice. Accordingly, justice necessarily entails a relationality. Human 
nature, thus understood, is expressed as persona/personality once seen as an 
individual. Thus, “rendering each one his right” touches on the individual and 
personal deed of justice in relation to its proper field and objective.21
2) Justice and Virtue
For St. Thomas, justice is one of the four cardinal virtues (prudence, justice, 
fortitude and temperance).22 These virtues make human acts just and a natural man 
good. This is relevant to justice. In justice, above all, shines the lustre of virtue.23
3) Categorizations of Justice
The first two categorizations of justice can be called Particular justice (iustitia 
particularis): particular justice is about the individual personality, that is to say, it is 
realized when individual personality relates to the common. This relationship is akin 
to that between parts and the whole. Here, two modes of relationship need to be 
distinguished. One is that between parts, that is, the way in which an individual 
personality relates to that of the other. Commutative justice applies to this kind of 
relationship, securing the mutual relationship between two personalities. The other is 
the relationship between parts and the whole, that is, the way in which the common is 
related to each personality. Distributive justice applies to this relationship, in which 
the common is distributed to the individual personality by proportionality. So 
21 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 1, c.
'Dicendum quod praedicta justitiae definitio conveniens est, si recte intelligatur. Cum enim omnis 
virtus sit habitus qui est principium boni actus, necesse est quod virtus definiatur per actum bonum 
circa propriam materiam virtutis. Est autem justitia proprie circa ea quae ad alterum sunt, sicut circa 
propriam materiam. Et ideo actus justitiae per comparationem ad propriam materiam, et objectum, 
tangitur cum dicitur, jus suum unicuique tribuens.' CL S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 7, c. 'ita etiam praeter iustitiam
legalem oportet esse particularem quamdam iustitiam, quae ordinet hominem circa ea quae sunt ad 
alteram singularem personam.' CL ad 1, 2, 3, Ibid. 11, c.
22 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 3, Sed contra.
'sed contra est quod Gregorius(Moralium Libri IT, 49.) dicit quod in quatuor virtutibus, scilicet 
temperantia, prudentia, fortitudine et justitia, tota boni operis structura consurgit. '
23 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 3, c.
'Human and moral virtue is that which makes a human act and the man himself good. And this applies 
to justice. For men's acts are good inasmuch as they reach the measure of reason, which is the norm of 
their rightness. Now since justice makes human acts right, it is clear that it makes them good. Cicero 
declares that men are called good chiefly because of their justice, and that in justice above all shines 
the luster of virtue.'
particular justice can be divided into two types, namely commutative and 
distributive.24
a) Commutative Justice (iustitia commutative): As said above, this form of 
justice applies to a mutual relationship between two individual personalities. It 
commands that exchange of goods and services takes place according to strict equality
of values. Aristotle holds that the mean (medium) in commutative justice is taken 
according to arithmetical proportions.25 Duties and rights that commutative justice 
entails are contractual. It is thus also called a contractual justice.26 The subject of 
rights and duties here is an individual in a social relationship, predisposed towards 
private interests. The bearer of rights is an individual (or corporate individual), and 
the object of the rights is private interest and private goods of the individual.27
b) Distributive Justice (iustitia distributiva): This applies when the whole 
relates to its parts. The relationship is about that between the common and the 
individual personalities. The distribution in this relationship follows the principle of 
proportionality. The bearer of duties and rights is an individual in a social, 
relationship, and the goal, the private interests of the individuals who comprise the 
society. The representatives, such as society or the state, are held responsible for the 
realization of distributive justice. 'The mean (medium) is taken in distributive justice 
according to geometrical proportion. So then the virtuous mean taken in distributive 
justice, not according to an equality between thing and thing, but according to a 
proportion between things and persons, and such a way that even as one person 
exceeds another so also that which is melted out to the other. Accordingly Aristotle 
[V Ethics, 3 et 4 1131a 29 et b 32] describes the mean here as being according to 
24 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, c.
'Justitia particularis ordinatur ad aliquam privatam personam, quae comparatur ad communitatem secut 
pars ad totum. Potest autem ad aliquam partem duplex ordo attendi. Unus quidem partis ad partem, cui 
similis est ordo unius privatae personae ad aliam; et hunc ordinem dirigit commutativa justitia, quae 
consistit in his quae mutuo fiunt inter duas personas ad invicem. Alius ordo attenditur totius ad partes,
et huic ordini assimilatur ordo ejus quod est commune ad singulas personas: quem quidem ordinem 
dirigit justitia distributiva, quae est distributiva communium secundum proportionalitatem. Et ideo 
duae sunt justitiae species, scilicet commutative et distritiva.'
25 S. Th. 2a 2ae, Ibid. 61, 2, Sed contra.
'Philosophus dicit, in V Ethic. (cc. 6, 7, 1131 a 30 b 15; b 32-1132 a 7) quod in justitia distributiva 
accipitur medium secundum geometricam proportionalitatem, in commutativa autem secundum 
arithmeticam.' Cf. S. Th. 2a 2ae, 61, c.
26 C. Henry Peschke, Christian Ethics IT,C. Goodliffe Neale, Dublin, 1978. P.217(a).
27 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, c.
geometric proportionality, in which the even balance or equality lies in a comparative 
relation, not in a fixed quantity.28 
c) General or Legal Justice (iustitia generalis vel legalis): This category of 
justice is about common good which all the members of a society have to perform. It 
is called a general justice, for it pursues the general good of the community. In case of
the state, this justice imposes on its citizens such duties as tax or military service as 
stipulated in law. Thus, it is also called a legal justice.29
d) Social Justice (iustitia socialis): Drawn from Pius XI Quadragesimo Anno, 
this concept of justice is highly relevant to our age. In pursuing common good, this 
mode of justice relies less on legally defined rights than on the natural rights of a 
community and its members.
Quadragesimo Anno was promulgated at a time when labour conflict was 
intensifying. Against this background, the labour question could not find its final 
solution in distributive, legal, or communitative justice. The final solution had to be 
found in a set of basic human natural rights. That is to say, everyone's right to lead a 
humane life needed to be protected and respected, by the society as a whole (and 
wealthy people), regardless of their material possessions, as long as they do not forfeit
it on account of evil deeds.
Children, for example, are entitled to survival, fostering, and education. This 
right needs to be upheld and respected by family, the state and all communities. 
Following the principles of social justice, parents are obliged to foster and raise, 
spiritually and physically, their children on account of their given status as parents. 
Children, in turn, are obliged to pay respect and return love to their parents.
28 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 61, 1, C, 2, Sed contra and c.
29 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 58, 5c.
'Iustitia ordinat hominem in comparatione ad alium; quod quidem potest esse dupliciter: uno modo ad 
alium singulariter consideratum; alio modo ad alium in communi, secundum scilicet quod ille qui servit
alicui communitati servit omnibus hominibus qui sub communitate illa continentur. Ad utrumque ergo 
se potest habere justitia secundum propriam rationem. Manifestum est autem quod omnes qui sub 
communitate aliqua continentur comparantur ad communitatem sicut partes ad totum; pars autem id 
quod est totius est; unde et quodlibet bonum partis est ordinabile in bonum totius. Secundum hoc ergo 
bonum cujuslibet virtutis, sive ordinantis aliquem hominem ad seipsum sive ordinantis ipsum ad 
aliquas alias personas singulares, est referibile ad bonum commune, ad quod ordinat justitia. Et
secundum hoc actus omnium virtutum possunt ad justitiam pertinere secundum quod ordinat hominem 
ad bonum commune. Et quantum ad hoc justitia dicitur virtus generalis. Et quia ad legem pertinet 
ordinare in bonum commune, inde est quod talis justitia praedicto modo generalis dicitur justitia 
legalis, quia scilicet per eam homo concordat legi ordinanti actus omnium virtu tum in bonum 
commune.' cf. c. Henry Peschke, Ibid. pp. 217-218.
Economically, workers are entitled to compensation for their labour on 
account of their status as .the supporters of their families. Politically, all and every 
type of government is obliged to provide its citizenry with opportunities for life, 
livelihood and labour, just as the citizens in turn have a duty to sustain such a 
government and society. The principle of social justice commands as a duty aides to 
the poor who cannot lead a humane life. One's entitlement to this form of right derives
from the natural rights of the poor, or simply, their right of survival. The question then
becomes how to expand and deepen our understanding of the basic right of survival. 
In this light, the belief in divine creation will revitalize our appreciation of social 
justice. For God created the wealth in this cosmos, not for a few, but for everyone in 
this world, that is, for all those who are coming by creation of His goodness and 
love.30
e) Vindicative Justice (iutitia vindicativa, retributive justice): According to St. 
Thomas, vengeance is an evil allowed for punishment of (malum poenale) those who 
have given offence and committed a crime. In vengeance, therefore, the intention 
(animus) of the avenger must be considered. Should his intention be centered chiefly 
upon the evil done to the recipient and is satisfied with that, then the act is entirely 
unlawful. Taking delight in evil done to another is in fact a type of hatred, the 
opposite of that love with which we are bound to love all. However, vengeance is 
lawful when the avenger intends a certain good, such as redemption of the sinner, 
peace of all, preservation of justice, or the honour of God.31
4) Justice and Love
30 Pius XI Quadragesimo Anno, 1931.
Cf. Bernard mixing, La Loi Du Christ, Vol. 1, 1955, Desclee & Co., Tournai (Belg.) pp. 305-307. C. 
Henry Peschke, Christian Ethics II. pp. 218-219.
31 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 108, 1, c.
'vindicatio fit per aliquod poenale malum inflictum peccati. Est ergo in vindicatione considerandus 
vindicantis animus. Si enim eius in tentio feratur principliter in malum illius de quo vindictam sumit, et
ibi quiescat, est omnino illicitum: quia delectari in malo alterius pertinet ad odium, quod caritati 
repugnant, qua omnes homines debemus diligere. Nee aliquis excusatur si malum intend at illius qui 
sibi iniuste intulit malum: sicut non excusatur aliquis per hoc quod odit se odientem. Non emin debet 
homo in alium peccare, propter hoc quod ille peccavit prius in ipsum: hoc enim est vinci a malo, quod 
Apostolus prohibet, Rom. 12,21, dicens: Noli vinei a malo: sed vince in bono malum. - Si vero intentio 
vindicantis feratur principaliter ad aliquod bonum, ad quod pervenitur per poenam peccantis, puta
emendationem peccantis, vel saltem ad cohibitionem eius et quietem aliorun, et ad iustitiae 
conservationem et Dei honorem, potest esse vindicatio licita, aliis debitis circumstantiis servatis.'
Although, without justice, neither a firm social order nor lasting peace is 
sustainable, justice needs to be bolstered by love even in the question of social order. 
As much as justice is a necessary precondition for peace, true peace is predicated on 
the practice of love for individuals and nations, and in that sense, peace is a 
consequence of love. Peace, as a consequence of love, cannot be achieved with 
recourse to justice only.
In fact, love is a higher virtue than justice is, which is a minimal requirement 
for our normative action. All duties of justice are those of love, and yet not all duties 
of love are those of justice. Love transcends justice.
By nature, justice presupposes love. The demands of social justice, in 
particular, can make full sense and be put into practice effectively only when seen 
from the perspective of brotherly love.32  Thus, the true and lasting justice in this 
worldly order needs to be anchored in love, and true love needs to be righteous and 
just. Unjust love is an oxymoron.
To summarize, St. Thomas's theory of justice follows the precepts of love in 
the Holy Scriptures; "Jesus replied: Listen, Israel, the Lord our God is the one Lord, 
and you must love the Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all 
your mind and with all your strength. The second is this: You must love your 
neighbor as yourself." [Mark 12: 29 - 31]
B) Confucian Conception of Justice
We are unable to find a "definition" of justice in the ethical systems of either 
Confucius or Mencius. Living as they did during periods of constant warfare, their 
philosophy was devoted to diagnosing the sources of injustice of their times and to 
eradicate them. As such, we can arrive at their conceptions of justice indirectly by 
looking at what they regarded as "injustice."
1) Confucius' diagnosis of the sources of Injustice and its remedy
Confucius regarded injustice from three different perspectives:
32 cf. c. Henry Peschke, Christian Ethics, vo!. IT. C. Goodliffe Neale, Dublin, 1978. pp.
219-220.
a) In the relationship between the King and his vassals. He observed that many
vassals overstep their authorities. Composing and reforming music and systems of 
rituals were regarded as the provenance of the king and those vassals who oversteped 
their authority and meddled in these affairs were subject to punishment. However, at a
time when the feudal order of Chou was crumbling, there were many vassals who 
disregarded such constraints on their authority. This Confucius regarded as injustice.
b) In terms of the relationship amongst feudal lords, the stronger constantly 
invaded and otherwise harassed the weaker ones. This Confucius regarded as unjust.
c) Feudal lords supplied their war machines by exploiting the people and 
through conscription, forced labor and taxation, extracted resources from the people 
which they used to enrich themselves. This Confucius also regarded as injustice.
Against these types of injustice Confucius proposes three remedies:
a) In order to restore the just order between the king and his vassals, 
Confucius advocated the "rectification of names"(正名) and "Overcoming the self and
returning to Propriety"(克己復禮)33 "Rectification of names" is a rule of behavior that
seeks to have people realize and return to their particular duties and rights appropriate 
to their station and status in life. Confucius also emphasizes the principle of 
"Overcoming the self and returning to Propriety.": "The Master said, 'to subdue one's 
self and return to propriety, is perfect virtue.'"
Only when people of all classes and backgrounds (in particular feudal lords) 
overcome self-interested behavior and perform duties and claim rights appropriate to 
their status can injustice disappear and a peaceful society achieved: "There is 
government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is
father, and the son is son."34
b) For those feudal lords involved in a battle of the "survival of the fittest", 
Confucius prescribes "human-heartedness" (仁) and "reciprocity." (恕) "Human 
heartedness" is something that only a perfect human character can achieve, but in 
specific contexts it means "love" (愛). When people forsake the pursuit of self-interest
and love one another, conflicts over interest would disappear and so would injustice.
33 『論語』「顏淵」1.”顏淵問仁, 子曰: 克己復禮, 為仁”. Confucian Analects, Book 
XII, Yen Yuan Chapter I.
34 『論語』「顏淵」11.”齊景公, 問政於孔子, 孔子對曰: 君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子.” 
Cf. Ibid., Chapter XI.
c) The third remedy that Confucius puts forth is "reciprocity." This is 
universal rule which exhorts people to regard the interests of others as one's own 
thereby enabling an equal distribution of profit.35 This will lead to a stable society. In 
order to ensure communal harmony, Confucius places greater emphasis on just 
distribution of goods rather than on their production.36
In Confucius we find a "perfectionist conception of justice" in which he seeks 
to eradicate the sources of injustice through the perfection of human character. This is
the principle behind his exhortations of "rectification of names," "overcoming oneself 
and returning to propriety," and "human heartedness." Another principle that we find 
in Confucius is the concept of "justice by agreement." In order to assure a just 
distribution of goods, one must arrive upon a universal principle of ethics through 
agreement.37
2) Mencius' Reinforcement of Confucian Prescriptions for Eradicating Injustice
Mencius reinforces Confucius "perfectionist conception of justice" through his
thesis that human beings are by nature good. By regarding the relationship between 
the rulers and the ruled as a contractual relationship he also reinforces Confucian 
principle of "justice by agreement."
Mencius argues that man is born with a sense of pity, shame, yielding, and 
rationality. It is when he expands and nurtures these innate abilities that he can 
achieve complete humanity. Mencius urges kings to have a sense of pity towards the 
people. Mencius thinks that if man can overcome selfishness and desire, conflict of 
interest can also be resolved. As such, Mencius says that if man seeks private wealth 
he cannot be human-hearted and if he seeks human-heartedness, then he cannot 
become wealthy.38
35  李承煥, 「儒家思想之社會哲學的再照明」高麗大學校, 1998, pp.51-56 參考 
Cf. Lee Seung-hwan, Re-interpretation of ConFucian SociaI PhiIosophy (Korea University press, 1998), pp. 51-
56.
36 宋榮培, ‘理想的社會觀及平和的倫理’ 「傳統及現代」7卷. Cf. Song Young-bae, 
"Confucian Vision of the Ideal Society and Ethics of Peace," Jontong gua hyundae Quarterly, Vo!. 7, 1999, p. 
234.
37 李承煥, 同上書, pp.56-61 參考.  CL Lee Seung-hwan, Op. cit., p. 57.      
38 『孟子』,「滕文公」上 3. “陽虎曰, 為富不仁矣，為仁不富矣”. Mencius, Tang 
Wen Kung, Part I, Chapter 3.
Mencius appeals to the sense of pity and exhorts the overcoming of selfishness
in order to avoid conflict of interest over distribution of wealth, but at the same time 
thinks that rule based on human-heartedness is necessary in order to ensure mutually 
beneficial relationship between the ruler and the ruled.39 In fact, he takes a step further
and tries to re-define the ruler-ruled relationship in terms of a contract.40
Mencius' philosophy is based on a philosophy of "for the people" in that he 
thinks the foremost task of government and rule is to feed and clothe the people. 
Human rule is a rule that ensures people's basic needs by providing them with land. 
This is where he proposes his famous theory of the "well-field system." (井田制)41
VI. Theory of Peace
A) St. Thomas's Theory of Peace
St. Thomas explores the question of peace In his Summa Theologiae (2a 2ae, 
29, 1-4).
1) Peace and Concord (Pax et Concordia)
In article 1, he clarifies the notion of concord and peace saying as follows: 
'concord, strictly speaking, involves other people who, in spite of their different 
feelings, come together in mutual agreement. Sometimes it also happens that in one 
person, the heart hankers after things opposed to each other. This occurs in two ways: 
either as regards the diverse appetitive powers, the sense-appetite often going contrary
to the rational; or when one and the same appetitive faculty wants diverse things 
which cannot in fact be had together, and so a conflict among the movements of 
appetite must follow. But harmony or union among such movements belongs to the 
very notion of peace; for even though a man has something he wants, his heart is 
restless as long as there still remains something else for him to want but cannot have 
39 『孟子』, 「離婁」上 9. Mencius, Ibid., Chapter 9.
40 『孟子』, 「公孫丑」下 4. Cf. Mencius, Gp. cit., Part 11,Chapter 4. Cf. Lee Seung-hwan, Op. cit.,
pp. 56-61.
41 宋榮培, 同上書, pp.236-237 參考.  Cf. Song, Young-8ae, Gp. cit., pp. 236-237.
at the same time. A union of this sort is not included in the notion of concord. Hence 
concord involves union of diverse appetites, but as between different people, whereas 
peace, in addition to this includes union among the appetites of the same person.'42 So 
St. Thomas goes beyond the concord of the diverse appetites of many people and 
considers peace which consists in the harmony or union of diverse appetites in the 
same person. So that peace derives fundamentally from the personality. As an external
pressure applied to this human nature or a personality, we recognize the concept of 
violence as opposed to that of peace.
St. Thomas clarifies his point that peace and harmony be established within a 
single personality first by drawing from Augustine's dictum that "pax hominum est 
tranquillitas ordinis" (City of God, Vol. 19: C.13). Of course, Augustine is talking 
about the peace that exists between man and man. However, there is no real peace 
where a man comes to an agreement with another not freely and of his own will, but 
forced into it by fear. Therefore, St. Thomas took Augustine's definition of peace as a 
"tranquility of order" to mean that such a peace begins with a restful status within a 
personality in which all the movements of appetites are at harmony with each other.43
St. Thomas asks if all things desire peace, to which he answers in the 
affirmative by drawing from Dionysius (De Divinis Nominibus, 11) and Augustine's 
saying that "omnia pacem appetunt."44
42 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 1, c. 'pax includit concordiam et aliquid addit. Unde ubicumque est pax ibi est 
concordia; non tamen ubicumque est concordia est pax, si nomen pacis proprie sumatur. Concordia 
enim, proprie sumpta, est ad alterum, inquantum scilicet diversorum cordium voluntates simul in unum 
consensum conveniunt. Contingit etiam unius hominis cor tendere in diversa, et hoc dupliciter. Uno 
quidem modo, secundum diversas potentias appetitivas: sicut appetitus sensitivus plerumque tendit in 
contrarium rationalis appetitus, secundum illud, Cam concupiscit adversus spiritum(Ad Gal. 5, 17). Alio 
modo, inquantum una et eadem vis appetitiva in diversa appetibilia tendit quae simul assequi non 
potest. Unde necesse est esse repugnantiam motuum appetitus. Unio autem horum motuum est quidem 
de ratione pacis; non enim homo habet pacatum cor quamdiu, etsi habeat aliquid quod vult, tamen 
adhuc restat ei aliquid volendum quod simul habere non potest. Haec autem unio non est de ratione 
concordiae. Unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium; pax autem, supra 
hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem.'
43 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 1, ad 1.
'Augustinus loquitur ibi de pace quae est unius hominis ad alium. Et hanc pacem dicit esse concordiam,
non quamlibet, sed ordinatam; ex eo scilicet quod unus homo concordat cum alio secundum illud quod 
utrique convenit. Si enim homo concordet cum alio non spontanea voluntate, sed quasi coactus timore 
alicujus mali imminentis, talis concordia non est vere pax; quia non servatur ordo utriusque 
concordantis, sed perturbatur ab aliquo timorem inferente. Et propter hoc praemittit quod pax est 
tranquillitas ordinis. Quae quidem tranquillitas consistit in hoc quod omnes motus appetitivi in uno 
homine conquiescunt.'
44 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 2, Sed contra.
2) Peace and Order (pax et ordo)
"The fact that a man desires a thing means that he desires to obtain what he 
desires, and consequently, the removal of anything that stands in the way of his doing 
so. Now such an obstacle, in the form of a contrary desire, can come either from 
oneself, or from another, and in both cases it is through peace that the obstacle is 
removed. Hence it must needs be that everything that desires anything at all desires 
peace, inasmuch as it desires tranquility and without hindrance to obtain its object, 
which is the very meaning of peace, defined by Augustine as the tranquility of 
order."45
St. Thomas's opinion that theologically explains peace as innate in our 
predisposition towards the tranquility of order needs to be examined ontologically, 
that is, from the perspective of our human nature and indeed the nature of everything. 
That is to say, pursuing peace derives especially from human nature.
3) Peace and Love (pax et caritas)
In article 3, St. Thomas asks if peace is "charity's own characteristic effects", 
and goes on to answer in the affirmative. This way, he thinks that charity is the cause 
of peace. This article is the culmination of his discourse on peace.
"Peace implies two kinds of union: one, a bringing of all one's own desires to 
an ordered unity; the other, union between one's own desires and those of another 
person. In both cases, it is charity that brings it about. In the first case, since charity 
means that we love God with our whole heart by referring everything to him, all our 
desires become focused on one object. Likewise with the other kind of union; for 
loving our neighbor as ourselves makes us want to do his will even as our own. This 
is why, says Aristotle [Ethic. IX, 4, 1166a7-10], that one thing that is necessary where
friends are concerned is that they choose the same things, and Cicero says the same 
[De Amicitia, C, 17] when he writes that friends have the same likes and dislikes."46
45 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 2, C.
46 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, c.
'duplex unio est de ratione pacis: quarum una est secundum ordinationem propriorum appetituum in 
unum; alia vero est secundum unionem appetitus proprii cum appetitu alterius. Et utramque unionem 
efficit caritas. Primam quidem unionem, secundum quod Deus diligitur ex toto corde, ut scilicet omnia 
referamus in ipsum, et sic omnes appetitus nostri in unum feruntur. Aliam vero, prout diligimus 
proximum sicut nosipsos, ex quo contingit quod homo vult implere voluntatem proximi sicut et sui 
ipsius. Et propter hoc inter amicabilia unum ponitur identitas electionis: ut patet in IX Ethic. (c. 4,1166 
a 7-10); et Tullius dicit, in libro de Amicitia(c. 17), quod amicorum est idem velle et nolle.'
This way, St. Thomas articulates the essential elements of peace based on 
Christian love, that is, love of God and one's neighbor. Peace, that is to say, originates
from the love of God and one's neighbor. The love of God of the human being is the 
most characteristic self-realization of human nature as the image of God and the love 
of one's neighbor based on the love of God is likewise.
However, St. Thomas is also aware of human imperfection here. "Sin makes a 
man turn away from the end he has to pursue, that is, the true good, which is the final 
goal of his existence. This means that his will is fixed on something that appears 
good. Therefore, a man needs the help of sanctifying grace to achieve true peace."47
To the dissent that there are irreducibly differing opinions about peace and 
love, St. Thomas responds by arguing that, insofar as a concord on primary goods 
exists, trivial differences in opinion does not amount to a disagreement in this life.48 
"Peace belongs to the virtue of charity. Peace is caused by love according as charity 
loves God and neighbor, and so there is no other virtue to which peace belongs as 
proper to it."49
4) Peace and Justice (pax et iustitia)
In his reply to the third (ad3), St. Thomas claims that justice is an indirect 
cause of peace. As I explored earlier, justice is rendering each what is his due; it thus 
removes obstacles to peace and resolves dissensions. Peace is thus a consequence of 
justice, but only indirectly. For it results directly from love, which by its nature causes
peace. "For love, as Dionysius says, is a unifying force, and peace is a union of 
appetites and tendencies."50
47 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 1.
'a gratia gratum faciente nullus deficit misi peccatum, ex quo contingit quod hono sit aversus a fine 
debito, in aliquo indebito finem constituens. Et secundum hoc appetites eius non inhaeret principaliter 
vero finali bono, sed apparenti. Et propter hoc sine gratia gratum faciente non potest esse vera pax, sed 
solum apparens.'
48 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 2.
49 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 4, c.
'Cum igitur pax causetur ex caritate secundum ipsam rationem, dilectionis Dei et proximi, non est alia 
virtus cuius pax sit proprius actus nisi caritas.'
50 S. Th. 2a 2ae, 29, 3, ad 3.
'Pax est opus iustitiae indrecte, inquantum scilicet rremovet prohibens. Sed est opus caritatis directe, 
quia secundum propriam rationem caritas pacem causat. Est enim amore vis unitiva, ut Dionysius dicit 
4 cap. De Divinis no minibus. Pax autem est unio appetitivarum inclinationum.'
5) Peace and Wisdom (pax et sapientia)
Wisdom conduces to peace. St. Thomas follows Augustine in explaining this 
dictum; "Augustine (De Serm. Dam. In Monte I, 4. ML34, 1235) teaches that wisdom 
befits the peacemakers. In them, there is no movement of rebellion, but a compliance 
with reason." He also invokes Augustine's definition of peace as "tranquility of 
order," (Pax est tranqullitas ordinis, De Civitate Dei, XIX, 13, ML 41, 640) adding 
that the act of ordering requires wisdom. From this follows the dictum that peace 
requires wisdom. This is what wisdom does, as Aristotle (Metaphysics. I, 2, 982a 18-
2) says. Therefore peace making is well suited to wisdom. Achieving peace is a work 
of love and making peace is a work of wisdom that creates a proper order. This 
argument is based on Paul's letters to Romans (8:29): "Romans, They are the ones he 
chose especially long ago to become true images of his Son, who is Wisdom 
Begotten."51 Therefore, wisdom, along with justice, is the indirect cause of peace. But 
its direct cause is love.
6) Peace, Joy, and Happiness (pax, gaudium et beatitudo)
St. Thomas focuses here on the first three of twelve fruits in Paul's Letters to 
the Galitians (5:22) - they are, love, joy, and peace. 'The spirit is well disposed in 
itself when it conducts itself well amid both good and evil. In regard to the good, the 
first disposition of the human soul is brought about by love, which is the first 
affection, and the root of all the others. Therefore, charity is given as the first Fruit of 
the Spirit. In it, the Holy Spirit is given especially, as in his proper likeness, since he 
himself is love. Hence, it is written, God's love has been poured into our heart through
the Holy Spirit who has been given to us.
The love of charity is necessarily followed by joy. For every lover rejoices in 
being united with the one he loves. But charity always has God whom it loves present,
as it is written, He who abides in love, abides in God, and God abides in him. Hence 
joy follows charity.
The perfection of joy, however, is peace, in two respects. First, as regards 
freedom from outward disturbances. For one cannot have perfect joy in the good 
which he loves if he is disturbed by other things. Likewise, he whose heart is perfectly
51 s. Th. 2a 2ae, 45, 6, c et ad 1.
satisfied by one thing, is not able to be disturbed by anything else, since he values 
everything else as nothing; thus it is written (Psalm 118: 165), "Great peace have 
those who love your name, and there is nothing to make them stumble.” That is to 
say, external things do not disturb them in such wise as to keep them from rejoicing in
God. Secondly, the perfection of joy is peace as regards the calming of restless desire.
For one cannot rejoice perfectly in something that does not satisfy him. Peace, 
however, implies these two things: that no outward thing disturb us, and that our 
desires should come to rest in one object. Hence, peace is listed third, after love and 
joy.'52
B) Confucian Conception of Peace
Here I will discuss Confucius and Mencius' conception of peace. Because they
lived during a period of constant turmoil and warfare their theory of peace centers 
around a theory of kingship and focuses on the concepts of human-heartedness(仁) 
and rule of human-heartedness(仁政) from a political and social perspective.
1) Confucius' Concept of Peace
Human-heartedness (仁) was the new meaning that Confucius gave to the 
formality of ritual propriety (禮). He says that if man is not human-hearted, ritual 
propriety is of no use. That is, propriety without love (仁) is meaningless. Human-
heartedness means to love man, to suppress oneself and to recover social norm. 
Overcoming oneself and achievement of human-heartedness can be had "When the 
love of superiority, boasting, resentments, and covetousness are repressed."53
As stated earlier, Confucius' emphasizes the "rectification of names" which is 
the principle that "There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is 
52 S. Th. la 2ae, 70, 3, c.
53 「論語」, 憲問, ‘克己怨欲不行焉, 可以為仁矣’. Cf. Confucian Analects, Book XIV, 
Ch.II.
minister; when the father is father, and the son is son."54 Confucius thought that it is 
when name and reality do not match that we have chaos and even war.55
Confucius wished to erect a new order based on ritual propriety. That is 
because ritual propriety is founded upon love. Indeed, the social consequence of ritual
propriety is value peace.56 Confucius' philosophy of human-heartedness is succeeded 
by the Mencian theory of the rule of human-heartedness (仁政) and the rule of the 
way (王道政治). During the Sung and Ming Dynasties, such philosophy gave rise to a
philosophy of "All things are one" (萬物一體論) which promoted not only love 
between men but also between man and all other creatures, leading to a very active 
conception of peace.57
2) Mencius' Concept of Peace
Mencius inherited Confucius' thoughts but was much more clear in the details 
and practical recommendations. Mencius is opposed to coercion and war: "Therefore, 
those who are skillful to fight should suffer the highest punishment. Next to them 
should be punished those who unite some princes in leagues against others; and next 
to them, those who take in grassy commons, imposing the cultivation of the ground on
the people."58 His clearest statement of a philosophy of peace can be seen in the 
following passage: "Mencius said, 'There are men who say-"I am skillful at 
marshalling troops, I am skillful at conducting a battle!"-They are great criminals."59
What Mencius calls “rule of the way” (王道政治), Way of the Ancient Kings, 
Way of Kings Yao and Shun, Rule of King Wen, is connected to what he calls the 
54 「論語」, 顏淵, ‘君君, 臣臣, 父父, 子子. ’ cf. Confucian Analects, Book XII, Yen Yuan, 
Chapter XI.
55  鄭仁在, ‘中國之平和思想’ ,「平和哲學」, 西江大學校, 哲學研究所, 1995. p. 
248. CL Chung In-jae, "Choongguk ui pyongwha sasang," (Chinese Philosophy of Peace) Pyunghwa jui 
cholhak, Sogang University, Institute of Philosophy, 1995, p. 248.
56 「論語」, ‘禮之用, 和為貴’. cf. Analects, Book I. Chapter XII
57  鄭仁在, 上書, pp. 245-251,  參考.  Cf. Chung, In-Jae, Gp. cit., pp. 241-250.
58 「孟子」, 離婁上, ‘故善戰者服上刑, 連諸侯者次之，辟草萊, 任土地者次之’.
Mencius, Book IV, Part I, Chapter XIV.
59 「孟子」, 盡心下, “有人曰: ‘我善為陳,  我善為戰, 大罪也! ’ ” Mencius, Book VII, 
Part n. Chapter IV.
“rule of the human-heartedness” (仁政). Rule of human-heartedness is to apply the 
moral imperative of human-heartedness to the spheres of politics and society. What 
Mencius means by rule of human heartedness is based on the idea that man cannot 
suffer to see others in pain, a philosophical foundation for his theory that man is 
innately good (性善论). As he was sure of this, it was clear to him that without the 
rule of human-heartedness, peace in all-under-the-heaven cannot be had.60
Mencius makes a distinction between the “rule of power” and the “rule of 
way.” The rule of way is what everyone wishes for and it is the only way to ensure 
peace. Rule of human heartedness can bring peace to all-under-heaven because it can 
capture the hearts of the people. He insists that only the rule of way and rule of 
human-heartedness can bring peace and that "Opportunities of time vouchsafed by 
Heaven are not equal to advantages of situation afforded by the Earth, and advantages
of situation afforded by the Earth are not equal to the union (human concord) arising 
from the accord of Men."61 Harmony among men means a state of peace.62
VII. Conclusion
A) Just Use of Force
St. Thomas rejects violence because it goes against human nature and dignity 
which is based on the Holy Trinity and also against Christ's commandment of love. 
However, he does admit just force.
The standard for just force has to do with self-defense and the preservation of 
a community's welfare and peace. In such cases, individuals as well as sovereigns of a
state or public office can exact private revenge and war. However, it cannot exceed 
the bounds of vindicative justice. Particularly in the case of war, it is only when there 
is sovereign order, just cause, and just intentions that one can speak of a just war. It is 
also allowed in the case of resistance against unjust rulers. This is when the sovereign 
60 「孟子」, 離婁上, ‘堯舜之道, 不以仁政, 不能平治天下’. "The principles of Yao 
and Shun, without a benevolent government, could not secure the tranquil order of the kingdom." 
Mencius, Book IV, part I, Chapter I.
61 「孟子」,公孫丑上, ‘天時不如地利，地利不如人和’. Mencius, Book II, Part II, 
Chapter 1.
62 鄭仁在, 上書,  pp. 250-253 , 參考.  Cf. Chung In-jae, Op. cit., pp. 250-253.
forsakes his duty to protect public interest and peace.63 As such, just force is allowed 
when it is the only means to preserve and promote human life and property.
B) Comparison of St. Thomas' and Confucian Conceptions of Justice
As we enter the Third Millennium, and as East and West seeks to be one, it is 
important and meaningful that we compare and contrast St. Thomas' and Confucian 
conceptions of justice. This is because otherwise, there is the danger of conflict 
between East and West. In the Middle East Israel and Muslim states are engaged in a 
vicious cycle of revenge and bloody violence. In many countries that overcame 
colonial rule it was only through lengthy periods of violence that such feats were 
accomplished as we have witnessed in the cases of Algeria, Vietnam, South Africa, 
China, etc.
St. Thomas first defines justice and then regards its violation as injustice. On 
the other hand, Confucians first describes the situation of injustice as it obtained 
during the period of constant warfare in which they lived. This was a highly 
pragmatic and realistic way of approaching the issue.
St. Thomas employs a finely honed logical argument to define and distinguish 
commutative justice, distributive justice, and vindicative justice. The modern 
conception of social justice was developed since the promulgation of 'Quadragesimo 
Anno' (1931) by Pope Pius XI based on St. Thomas' conception of justice which is 
based on human-ness and human community. In contrast, Confucians try to realize 
justice by eradicating the sources of social injustice. Here, a much more synthetic 
conception of justice is employed to explain commutative justice, distributive justice 
and what we today call social justice. However, since it presupposes the ancient 
feudal order of China, it focuses on the duties of the rulers, the discussions are 
concentrated more on distributive justice. Such a conception is mostly concerned with
political and social aspects of justice.
However, both conceptions are similar in that they regard the issues of justice 
ultimately in terms of a man's state of mind. Confucians arrive at justice through 
human-heartedness and the rule of human-heartedness while St. Thomas emphasizes 
63 cf. S. Th. 2a 2ae, 44, 64, 66: CL Chae Yi-byung, Jongdanghan poknyok un hoyongdoenunga? (Is a 
Just Use of Force Permissible?) Tulsumnalsum, 2002. 2. 28-29.
love of God and one’s neighbors as fundamental to justice. In practical contexts, 
Confucians interpret human-heartedness as love of man. In order to realize human-
heartedness Confucians emphasize "rectification of name," "overcoming the self and 
returning to ritual propriety," "sense of pity," "sense of shame," "sense of 
compromise," and "sense of discernment." This is similar to the emphasis that 
Christianity places on self-discipline and love in the Decalogue and Christ's teachings.
As for the principle of rectification of names, Christianity has its own distinct and 
more fundamental interpretation that the body has many parts and that each part has a 
different function to fulfill, thus leading to a healthy body (I Cor. 12, 12-13). Of 
course, this speaks to the mystical body of Christ, but it can also be applied to social 
life.
With regard to self-discipline, Christianity also refers to something more 
fundamental as it exhorts one to even give up one's life to realize love: 'Anyone who 
does not take his cross and follow my footsteps is not worthy of me. Anyone who 
finds his life will lose it; anyone who loses for my sake will find it." (Mt. 10, 38-39.); 
"I tell you, most solemnly, unless a wheat grain falls on the ground and dies it remains
only a single grain; but if it dies, it yields a rich harvest. If anyone serves me, my 
father will honor him." (John 12, 24-26); "Love is always patient and kind; it is never 
jealous; love is never boastful or conceited; it is never rude or selfish; it does not take 
offence, and is not resentful. Love takes no pleasure in other people's sins but delights
in the truth; it is always ready by excuse, to trust, to hope and to endure whatever 
comes." (I Cor. 13, 1-7); "A man can have no greater love than to lay down his life for
his friends." (John 15, 13); "If your enemy is hungry, you should give him food, and if
he is thirsty, let him drink. Thus you heap red-hot coals on his head. Resist evil and 
conquer it with good." (Rom. 12, 20-21.)
In Confucianism we encounter a more naturalistic, humanistic and immanent 
conceptions such as "rectification of names," "overcoming the self and returning to 
ritual propriety," "sense of pity," "four constants," etc. The teachings of Christ, on the 
other hand, because they are based on the relationship between God and man, explain 
human life from the view of transcendence and immanence. Also in the teachings of 
Christ, the communion through prayer and grace is emphasized. The Bible says "Set 
your hearts on his Kingdom first, and on his righteousness (iustitiae), and all these 
other things will be given as well." (Mt 6, 33) and "For I tell you if your virtue 
(iustitia) goes no deeper than that of scribes and Pharisees, you will never get into the 
Kingdom of heaven." (Mt 5, 20)
C) Comparison of St. Thomas' and Confucian Conceptions of Peace
Both St. Thomas and Confucians think that peace is impossible without 
justice. St. Thomas is more explicit on this point by saying that Justice is not a direct, 
but indirect cause of peace.
Confucians in general, and Mencius in particular, define war as evil and 
thereby reject it completely, while striving for an ideal state of peace without war, 
government of human-heartedness (仁政), rule of way (王道政治). St. Thomas, on 
the other hand, admits the use of just force in cases of personal and state-based self-
defense. However, he makes it clear that peace and order in this life is an incomplete 
peace in comparison to the real peace without war, peace without conflict and 
instability, and eternal peace achievable in the next world. The incomplete peace in 
this life is on the way towards the eternal peace.
Such peace can be achieved first and foremost in one's heart, achievable 
through ordering the inner self. This is in turn achieved through loving God and one's 
neighbors. Love is the direct cause of peace. Here we witness the analytical as well as 
comprehensive nature of St. Thomas' conceptions of justice and peace. While 
Confucian conceptions are limited within the bounds of this world, that is, they are of 
an immanent character. St. Thomas' are of this world while fundamentally 
transcendental as they are based on revealed truth. However, in the Confucian 
conception of man as juxtaposed with 'Heaven' we also find an abundant potentiality 
for transcendence, but as such the potentiality is explained by merely 
anthropomorphic description.
St. Augustine who said "peace is tranquility of order", posits an interesting 
dialectic of peace: "There can be peace without any kind of war, but no war that does 
not suppose some kind of peace."64 Human nature thus rejects violence and desires 
peace.
64 Pax quaedam sine ullo bello, bellum vero esse sine aliqua pace non potest. (De Civitate Dei 19, 3)
D) Conception of Peace for the Future
To solve the problem of violence and peace of our times we must start from 
"giving back that which belongs to each." (unicuique sum retribuere). In our times we 
have the likes of Gandhi, Schweitzer as champions of peace and, of course, Mother 
Theresa, the embodiment of love. In addition, we have Pope Leo XIII (Rerum 
Novarum), Pius XI (Quadragesimo Anno), John XXIII (Pacem in Terris), Paul VI 
(Gaudium et Spes) who have contributed to the building of peace on the foundations 
of God's words, and on St. Thomas' theories of human nature while condemning the 
unjust violence. Also, numerous Catholic philosophers, theologians and intellectuals 
of diverse fields have worked as theorists and activists of peace in order to articulate 
conceptions of justice and peace for our times. Now, we need also to look towards the
works of Confucian scholars who have also been working to produce their own 
distinct conceptions of justice and peace for our times. In fact, in recent years, 
numerous Korean scholars have been putting forth powerful new interpretations of 
Confucian justice and peace.65
Today, in the face of astonishing advances in science and technology, 
mankind is increasingly forced to humanize them. Man's conscience and living 
environment, especially social institutions have been fundamentally altered with the 
advances in science and technology. The invention of fire, casting of iron and steel, 
helio-centric worldview, development in navigation and aviation, invention of steam 
power and electricity, of rockets and nuclear power, etc. have brought enormous 
changes and benefits to mankind and caused tremendous problems, too. Intellectuals 
in the fields of religion, sciences, and culture have worked hard to articulate new 
values and ethical vision for each new advances in science and technology which 
brought new dimensions of human life. Now, science and technology are opening up 
new frontiers with the completion of Genome mapping, human cloning, the 
digitalization, the cyber-world and the internet, etc. The enormous capacity and 
genius of mankind is once again in full display. Science is enabling mankind to 
overcome space and time in a way never imagined possible in the past, thereby 
prolonging life and providing a fast-paced and comfortable life, etc. At the same time 
65 Hahm Chai-bong, Lee Seung-hwan, Kim Seung-hye, Park Young-il, Chung In-jae are some of the 
leading scholars in this field who have come back to Korea after receiving advanced degrees from 
leading Chinese, North American, and European Universities.
it is shaking our worldview and values from their foundations, thereby seriously 
injuring the image of God within man. Such advances in science and technology can 
also be put in the service of violence, leading to unimaginable tragic consequences.
In the first few centuries of the new millennium mankind must eradicate 
violence. It therefore needs to rearticulate a vision of justice and peace for the new 
era. What is needed then, is a more profound investigation, further appreciation and 
strengthening of a conception of justice based on the principle, "to each his own" for 
human being as the image of God and nature as the vestigium of God.
This is especially true for Asia. Asia is not only the largest in terms of land 
mass as well as population, but also is the home to major world religions, 
philosophies, and civilizations. People in Asia still lead deeply religious lives. They 
still feel victimized by colonial powers for centuries and that their spirit was 
repressed, economies exploited, and cultural treasures looted. Such feelings will 
continue to have major consequences for the future. Here, mankind must heed the old 
saying that "things call for their masters" (res c1amat ad dominum). The perpetrators 
must compensate the victims. The best way is through conversation. The necessity for
holding conversations with a mutual respect, wisdom and courage, and mutual 
compromise and love where the East and West can truly come to a mutual 
understanding and co-operation on these issues has never been greater. Otherwise, we 
could be facing much more backlash and reaction. And also, the underdeveloped 
countries must recognize that they have benefited from the advanced science, 
technologies, bio-medicines, economic development, social institutions, social 
welfare, democracy, human rights, etc. from the developed countries. So they must do
their best to improve their quality of life. Moreover they also have to contribute to the 
progress of mankind by the tireless toil, especially for the peace of mankind. Above 
all, the developed countries must help the underdeveloped countries to extricate 
themselves from poverty, starvation and disease that brings thousands of deaths. They
also must help without any second thought to educate the people of underdeveloped 
countries to allow them to live a human life in the image of God. And also, it is quite 
desired that the developed countries invest their capital in the underdeveloped 
countries and let them participate fully in advanced technologies. Human conscience 
of our time is experiencing such a turn whether we know or not, that is, history of 
human life and culture proceeds according to the oeconomia of the Creator. I believe 
that here lies the great vocation of the Catholic Church and the Catholic philosophers. 
It is therefore heartening to see that in recent years, the Vatican and others of the 
Catholic world are hosting numerous cultural and scholarly conferences. For these 
things to come to fruition and produce concrete results it is imperative that we realize 
the universal values of love of mankind and nature while conducting further inquiries 
into life philosophies of both the East and the West that can assure peaceful co-
existence, co-life and co-prosperity. This is where various religions can make a major 
contribution.66
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